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We combine firm-level data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES) with 
data on private and public credit registries to investigate whether the presence of the credit registry in a 
country is associated with lower financing constraints, as perceived by managers and higher share of bank 
financing. We find that the existence of private credit registries is associated with lower financing 
constraints and higher share of bank financing, while the existence of public credit registries does not seem 
to have a significant effect on these perceived financing constraints. We also find that small and medium 
firms tend to have higher share of bank financing in countries where private registries exist and stronger 
rule of law is associated with more effective private credit registries. Finally, we find some evidence that 
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A large body of recent literature shows that access to credit is essential for 
development and growth.  However, asymmetric information between borrowers and 
lenders results in inefficient allocation of credit and credit rationing. Collateral is 
commonly used as one of the tools to reduce this asymmetric information. However, 
collateralization of loans is often problematic especially in the developing country 
context and especially for new firms, micro-entrepreneurs, and SMEs which often lack 
significant fixed assets that could be presented as collateral.  In addition, the costs for 
lenders related to seizure and liquidation of collateral can be significant, and the process 
can take a long time.  
The alternative mechanisms for reducing asymmetric information are monitoring 
and screening by lenders. For example, in many countries it is common to grant credit to 
a firm only after the firm has had an account with the bank and that bank could observe 
cash flow for some period of time, typically six months to a year.   Another example is a 
group lending approach, mostly employed by microfinance institutions, which allows 
lenders to provide loans to individual borrowers who, via participation in the group, have 
developed a credit history with the institution.  In these examples credit history of a 
borrower, sometimes referred to as “reputational collateral”,  enables an individual or a 
firm to gain access to financing. 
Information accumulated by lenders through monitoring and screening can be 
shared among credit providers creating a credit market environment with lower 
informational asymmetries and leading to more efficient allocation of credit. The 
institutional arrangements allowing creditors to exchange information on past payment 
behavior of individuals and firms are commonly known as credit bureaus or credit   3
registries. Such registries collect and distribute factual data on payment performance, as 
well as other information used to assess creditworthiness of a borrower.  These   
information sharing mechanisms may be able to lower information asymmetries and 
support larger lending volumes, thus softening financing constraints faced by firms and 
individual borrowers. In this paper we use the results of a firm level survey to investigate 
the impact of existence of credit reporting institutions on firms financing constraints.   
We combine responses of about 5000 enterprises from 51 countries around the 
world from the World Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES)
1 with a survey of 
credit registries around the world conducted at the World Bank and described in Miller 
(2003).  We use two alternative variables to measure financing constraints.   The first one 
is based on the answers given by firm managers to the question in the WBES survey 
about the degree of financing constraints that firms face.
2  We test whether perceptions of 
the borrowers with regards to the credit constraints they face are related to the presence 
of credit registry in their country. In addition, we test whether public and private credit 
registries have the same or different effect on perceived financing constraints and 
whether they act as complements or substitutes.  Another measure that we employ is use 
of the bank credit by firms.   Clearly,  the fact that the firm does not have any loans on 
the books does not necessarily imply that bank financing is unavailable.  Many other firm 
level and macro level factors are at play.  We control for such macro factors as interest 
rate and economic growth as well as firm size, ownership, age and industry.   While this 
                                                 
1 The World Bank Business Environment Survey was conducted by the World Bank in 1999.  
2 The question asks the firms to rate the severity of different factors for operation and growth of the 
business on a scale from 1 to 4 with 4 being a “major obstacle” and 1 as “no obstacle.” We use the reported 
degree of obstacle with respect to availability of financing as a measure of perceived financing constraints.    4
measure is not necessarily a measure of financing constraint, in our view it is a useful 
proxy  for availability of bank finance.   
We expect to find different effects of public and private registries on credit 
market outcomes because the two types of registries differ significantly in the way they 
operate. Public registries are often established by Central Banks with the main purpose of  
bank supervision, while private registries are created by market participants with the 
purpose of sharing information among lenders. As a consequence, public registries 
usually collect information only on loans above certain amount, focusing on credits 
which are likely to have a systemic effect on the economy. In addition, public registries 
usually collect information only from supervised institutions, and store only a few key 
data items.
3 On the other side, private registries are more likely to collect information 
from a wide variety of sources including non-bank creditors, and store more details on 
the borrowers. Another key difference is the fact that public registries often do not 
provide a history of a borrower, but rather a current status, while private registries supply 
a report on the payment history. Finally, private bureaus often provide value added 
services such as decision making tools and credit scoring. See Miller (2003) for a more 
detailed discussion on the differences between public and private registries.  
These arguments suggest that public registries could play at best a limited role in 
alleviating a firm’s financing constraints. Indeed, we find no evidence that existence of a 
public credit registry is associated with reduction in perceived financing constraints or 
with a higher reliance on bank financing by firms. On the other side, the existence of a 
                                                 
3 For example, out of 37 public registries that responded to the survey, 31 make data available only to 
institutions providing data, which in most countries would mean exclusion of non-bank financial 
institutions and other non-bank credit providers.  The growing importance of non-bank lenders, including   5
private credit bureau is strongly associated with reduction in a firm’s perceived financing 
constraints and a higher share of bank financing. The effect of private registries is robust 
to controlling for other potential determinants of financing constraints such as the overall 
level of economic and financial development, the quality of the legal system (rule of 
law), legal origin and others.   
The main contribution of our study is the use of firm-level data, which allows us 
to answer several other important questions that have not been addressed before. First, we 
test whether the existence of registries has disproportional effect on firms of difference 
sizes. It is possible that small firms could benefit more from the presence of registries 
because they are more “opaque” and face larger information asymmetries.  We do find 
that in countries where private credit registry exists, small and medium firms have higher 
proportion of bank financing.  We do not find similar effect on perceived financing 
constraints. It is possible that  while private credit registry does make finance somewhat 
more available to smaller firms,  it is not sufficient to satisfy financing needs of these 
firms.  
Second, we test whether existence of a registry has different effects on young and 
old firms. To benefit from the registry the firm needs to accumulate some credit history 
of prompt repayment of credit and young firms that have not had a chance to establish 
such a history may not benefit from the registry immediately. However, we do not find 
support for this hypothesis.  Instead we find an indication that new firms gain from the 
existence of public registry. 
                                                                                                                                                 
leasing and factoring companies around the world, implies that leaving out information on their clients 
would significantly undermine the predictive power of available database.   6
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section I discusses related literature, 
section II describes the data, section III presents results and section IV discusses 
implications and limitations of our study and provides directions for further research.  
 
I.  Related Literature  
This paper builds on two lines of research: 1) studies of firm financing constraints 
and their determinants; and 2) relatively new field of research focusing on the role of 
credit reporting institutions in decreasing information asymmetries and their effect on the 
credit market. Below we briefly review the papers related to credit registries and 
information sharing and refer interested readers to surveys of literature on financing 
constraints in Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998). 
In a theoretical model of information sharing, Jappelli and Pagano (1993) show 
that  exchange of information on borrower type decreases default rates and reduces 
average interest rates. In a related paper Padilla and Pagano (1997) show that information 
sharing among borrowers would lead to lower interest rates and increased lending. 
Empirically testing these predictions  Jappelli and Pagano (2001) find that credit 
information sharing is associated with higher lending, measured by private credit to GNP 
ratio, and lower defaults.   
Miller (2003) presents a comprehensive study of credit reporting systems in 
nearly 80 countries around the world.  She discusses credit registries in both public and 
private credit sectors, investigates the view of credit reporting by borrowers and derives 
international trends in development of credit registries.     7
  We are aware of only one study of the impact of credit information on financing 
constraints: Galindo and Miller (2001), using firm-level data from Worldscope, study 
how the quality of information in the registry affects financing constraints for firms in 
Latin America.  They find that index of the information coverage in the credit registry is 
associated with reduction in the sensitivity of investment to availability of internal 
funding, indicating lower financing constraints. Unlike Galindo and Miller (2001)  we 
use self-reported degree of financing constraints by firms rather than relying on the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity model, which has been questioned recently by numerous 
authors (see, for example, Kaplan and Zingales (1997)). In addition, we distinguish 
between public and private registries (while they don’t) and investigate the differential 
effect of credit registries on small and medium firms and young and old firms.  
 Our paper is also related to three recent studies of firm financing constraints 
using the same WBES data. Clarke et. al (2001) investigate the impact of  foreign bank 
entry on access to finance for domestic firms and Beck et. al (2002a) study the effect of  
banking sector concentration on financing constraints faced by firms. The methodology 
used in our paper follows closely these two previous papers. Other related evidence is 
presented in Beck et. al (2002b) who find that financing constraints represent a 
significant obstacle to growth, especially for small firms.   
 
II.  Data and methodology 
To investigate the effects of credit reporting on financing constraints we combine 
firm-level data from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and country-level 
responses from the Public and Private Credit Registry surveys conducted by the World   8
Bank.  The WBES was conducted in 1999-2000 and covers more than 10,000 firms in 80 
countries.  After merging it with registry survey data and eliminating observations with 
missing key data, our sample includes 51 developed and developing countries in all 
regions of the world and covers about 5000 firms. In the WBES survey, firm managers 
and owners were requested to answer questions about business environment including 
such issues as corruption, judiciary, infrastructure, regulation and taxation, and access to 
financing.  Thus the survey allows us to study the opinions of managers on the relative 
importance of various issues in doing business.  
To measure perceived financing constraints we use answers to a question about 
various factors that represent constraints to the operation and growth of a business. The 
respondents were asked to rate various constraints including financing, infrastructure, 
inflation and other on scale from 1 to 4, with 1 meaning “no obstacle” and 4 a “major 
obstacle” for operations and growth of the business.  Our focus is on the answers to the 
sub question about access to financing.  Our main dependent variable is a dummy which 
equals one if firms report financing as a “major constraint” and zero otherwise. We use a 
binary indicator because we are concerned that respondents might have a difficult time 
distinguishing between a “minor obstacle” or “moderate obstacle” and so the relative 
ranking would clearly be a matter of a personal opinion. Using only a binary indicator 
somewhat mitigates this problem as it is likely that managers are better able to identify 
the “major obstacles”  relative to other “less severe obstacles”. In addition, in the survey 
the number of possible factors selected as the “major obstacle” was limited to 3 out of 12   9
possible obstacles, which adds additional credibility to the “major obstacle” response 
relative to other responses.
4   
To measure reliance on bank funding by firms we use the answer to the question 
on the firm’s financing structure in the past year.  Managers were asked to provide 
percentage of financing coming from the following sources: internal funds and retained 
earnings, equity, local commercial banks,  investment funds  and development banks, 
other state services, foreign banks, family or friends, money lenders, supplier credit, and 
leasing arrangement. Our main dependent variable reflects cumulative share of financing 
obtained from commercial banks, development banks and foreign banks in overall firm 
financing.  It is common in survey data to see many answers clustered around round 
numbers.
5 We define our dependent variable to take this pattern into account: it  takes 
value of 0 if there is no bank financing, value of one if bank financing share is less or 
equal to 10%, value of 2 if it is more than 10% but less or equal to 20%, and so on. We 
have also conducted robustness checks using dummy variable equal to one if share of 
bank financing is non-zero and received similar results.   
Our two models can simply be written as: 
Pr. (Finance is a major obstacle) ic = αXic + βREGISTRYc + γMc + eic.      (1) 
Pr. (Level of bank finance ) ic = αXic + βREGISTRYc + γMc + eic.         (2) 
                                                 
4 However, we have also used the categorical answers with all 4 relative responses using ordered probit 
regressions and find results similar to those reported. 
5 For example, in our data we observe that about 5% of respondents report  10% of financing from 
domestic banks, another 5% report 20% and less than 2% have answers in between 10% and 20%, most of 
them are equal to 15%.   10
Where  i indexes firms and c indexes countries, Xij is a vector of firm-level 
characteristics such as ownership, industry, size and years in business,
6 REGISTRYc, is a 
country-level indicator of the presence of a registry (either public or private or both) and 
Mc is a set of other country-level controls (level of development, rule of law etc.). The 
complete list of all the variables we use in this paper with their definitions and sources is 
given in the Appendix Table A1.  
We also experiment with the interaction of two registries to test whether two 
registries are complimentary in their effect on financing constraints and reliance on bank 
financing, which is plausible because they play different roles (as discussed in the 
introduction). We estimate model (1) using probit procedure and model (2) using ordered 
probit procedure. In all regressions we adjust standard errors to allow for “clustering” on 
country level. The errors calculated in such a way are robust to unspecified correlation of 
firm-level errors within each country. All our results are stronger if estimated without this 
clustering option.  
For information on credit registries we use results from two surveys conducted by 
the World Bank in 1999-2000 and described in Miller (2003).  Since banks need time to  
integrate the credit registry into their credit risk management systems, we only take into 
account registries that have been established prior to 1998, which allows one year 
between the establishment of a registry and a circulation of the WBES survey in 1999. 
We create two dummy variables – one for a public registry and one for a private registry.  
In our sample of 52 countries 28 had a public credit registry and 27 countries have private 
                                                 
6 Our sample has 16% of firms with foreign ownership, 13% with government ownership, 35% in 
manufacturing and 47% in service industry.  The average age of firms in the sample is 20 years.   11
registry. We also use the year of establishment of the registry to test whether registries 
that have been in operation for longer periods have more effect on financing constraints. 
 As is evident from Table 1, development of credit reporting has a regional aspect.  
In the developed world most countries have a private credit reporting system.  Some 
developed countries also have a public registry operated at the central bank.  Latin 
America is the region with the most widespread credit reporting systems in the 
developing world, and most  countries have both public and private credit registries.  
Some countries had registries operating for decades, for example the largest credit 
registry in the developing world is SERASA which was established in Brazil in 1968.  
The oldest public registry in the region is in Mexico; it was established in 1964.  At the 
same time many countries established registries in the 1990s, including PCRs in Brazil 
and Ecuador in 1997. 
Eastern Europe and CIS have the least developed credit reporting.  For the most 
part neither public nor private registries exist in the region.  Public credit registries in 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania started operations after 1998.  Hungary and Poland 
established private credit registries  in 1997.  Most countries in the region are currently 
establishing credit registries in public or private sector. 
 
IV. Results 
We start our analysis in Table 2, Panel A with a cross-tabulation of the average 
financing constraints (measured on a scale 1-4) and the existence of private and public 
credit registries. We find the highest average constraints are observed in countries with 
no registries present and the lowest average constraints are in countries with only private   12
registries present. Thus, presence of a public registry in addition to a private registry is 
associated with higher average constraints, while presence of a public registry without a 
private registry seems to reduce the constraints.  In terms of the magnitude of the effect, 
we see that the existence of a private registry has larger effect on reduction in constraints 
than the existence of a public registry. Thus, the average constraints are about 3.04 in 
countries with no private registry and 2.57 in countries with private registry; the 
difference is equal to about 40% of a one standard deviation in the general financing 
constraints variable. For public registries the difference is much smaller: average 
constraints of 2.91 relative to 2.69, which is only about 20% of a one standard deviation 
in the constraints responses.  However, both differences are statistically significant at 1%. 
We find a very similar relationship in Panel B where we cross-tabulate the level of 
financial development, measured as a ratio of private credit to GDP and the existence of 
either registry. Again, all differences are significant at 1% level. The latter set of results is 
consistent with Jappelli and Pagano (2001) who find that the existence of credit registries 
is associated with higher lending, measured by private credit to GNP ratio.   In panel C 
again, in countries where registries exist there is a higher probability that a firm will have 
bank financing.   But unlike with previous indicators, the highest probability to have bank 
financing is in countries with both private and  public credit registries, followed by 
countries with only private credit registries.  The difference is significant at 1%.    Cross 
tabulations point to the fact that while public registry has a positive effect on individual 
firm’s share of bank financing, it does not have the same effect on perceived financing 
constraints or depth of credit market. 
     13
Our first set of regression results is presented in Table 3.  Panel A includes 
regressions with dummy dependent variable DGCF measuring perceived financing 
constraints and  Panel B provides the results of ordered probit regressions with the 
dependent variable BKF10 measuring reliance of a firm on bank financing.  We use 
identical firm level control variables in the two sets of regressions.    Results in panel A 
suggest that based on the perception based indicator DGCF, government owned and 
small or medium size firms are more likely to be financially constrained, while foreign 
owned firms, and firms in manufacturing and service industry (in comparison to 
agriculture) are likely to face less financing constraints. These coefficients are highly 
significant (at 1%) and are robust to changes in specifications.  Panel B results are 
consistent with the results of Panel A only for small and medium firms –   they have 
higher perceived financing constraints and significantly smaller portion of bank financing 
than the large firms.  The result for small firms is stronger than for medium firms, as 
expected.  We find that new firms have significantly smaller values of BKF10 while in 
Panel A coefficient was insignificant.  Manufacturing firms, as expected, have 
significantly higher share of bank financing.  Interestingly, neither the dummy variable 
for government owned firms (perceived high constraint) nor for foreign owned firms 
(perceived low constraint)  had significant coefficients.  This could indicate that 
government owned firms have higher financing needs that are not addressed.  The fact 
that foreign firms do not view financing as a major constraint is plausible because they 
may rely on the finance provided by their foreign parent.  
Studying the country level effects on the perceived financing constraints, we find 
(model A1) that when  rule of law,  private credit to GDP ratio, GNI per capita and real   14
interest rates are included all together, only the rule of law is significant and firms in 
countries with better rule of law have lower financing constraints. However, all these four 
country-level variables are highly correlated and they loose significance when included 
together because of the multicollinearity; they are significant when included individually 
and have their expected signs.  We keep only rule of law variable for our baseline 
specification to further investigate the role of credit registries for perceived financing 
constraints  
It is reasonable to expect that attitudes of individual managers may have effect on 
their assessment of financing constraints.  We try to control for each manager’s general 
perceptions of other (non-financial) constraints with the variable which we call 
“Pessimism”.  It is likely that a  manager who answers most of questions on any type of 
constraint negatively (i.e. complaining of high constraints) will be more likely to report 
major financing constraints. Therefore we are concerned that our measure of financing 
constraints might simply pick up the manager’s tendency to complain about other 
obstacles.  We construct a variable “pessimism” by taking this manager’s  answers to 
several non-finance related questions such as quality of customs, courts, post office, 
education, and other aspects of public service provision that are ranked from 1 to 6  (1 
meaning very good and 6 – very bad) and  create a firm-average of these responses. The 
larger the index, the more pessimistic the manager.  We then subtract the country-level 
mean of this pessimist index to capture the firm-specific component of the pessimism 
level (although without country differencing all the results are very similar). We find that 
this variable is highly significant and positive in all specifications with dependent 
variable DGCF, indicating that a manager who generally tends to complain of other   15
constraints is more likely to answer that his firm is financially constrained.  At the same 
time this variable is never found to be significant in regressions with dependent variable 
DBKF10. 
Baseline regression specification for reliance on bank finance includes GDP 
growth, as a proxy for expectations of future investment opportunities, and real interest 
rate
7.  GNI per capita, private credit to GDP ratio and rule of law  are all insignificant 
when included together. 
As for the main question of this paper – the relation of credit registries and 
availability of financing, we find that existence of a private credit registry is associated 
with lower incidence of severe financing constraints (i.e. lower probability of firms rating 
finance as a major obstacle) and higher average share of bank financing.  The coefficients 
are strongly significant in almost all specifications. Public registry, however,  is 
insignificant in both cases. Thus, we do not find any clear relation between perceived 
financing constraints or reliance on bank financing and the existence of a public registry. 
In model A3 we add the interaction of two registries dummies and it turns out positive 
and significant. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that firms in countries with 
only private registry present have the lowest perceived constraints, on average. This 
means that firms in countries that have public registry in addition to private registry are 
more constrained than those that only have private registry. These results suggest that 
there is no additional complementary effect of public registry on self-reported financing 
constraints in countries with existing private registry.  In similar regression in model B3 
the coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant, indicating no complimentary 
                                                 
7 We have also experimented with other possible controls, but found that rule of law, GNI per capita, 
private credit to GDP, and “pessimism” have insignificant coefficients.   16
effects of the two types of registries on bank financing.  These results do not imply that 
there is no role for public registries, but only that they have no effect on alleviation of a 
firm’s self-reported financing constraints or their reliance on bank financing. There are 
clearly other potential benefits from public registries (such as aiding in bank regulation 
and supervision, preventing systematic bank failures etc) which we do not investigate in 
this paper and leave these issues for further research.   
In models A4 and B4 we add the (log of the) age of the registry measured by the 
number of years since the establishment of the registry to test the hypothesis whether the 
advantage of the registries is increasing with the length of their operation. We find that 
age of private registry is positively associated with reduction in perceived financing 
constrained (although it is not significant at conventional levels, it is weakly significant at 
about 16%) and significantly correlated with the use of bank finance.  Consistent with 
expectations, in countries where private credit registry existed for a longer period of time, 
there is more reliance on bank credit. These results should be treated with caution 
because our date of the registry establishment is a very noisy measure of the age of the 
registry. Plus the proper way to test whether registries become more effective with time 
would be to use the time-series data, which we cannot do here since our WBES data is 
only a cross-section of firms. 
We next take a closer look at the effects of private and public registries on 
financing constraints and reliance on bank financing separately. Table 4 presents results 
of regressions with perceived financing constraints as a dependent variable.  The private 
registry dummy always enters with the expected negative sign and usually is highly 
significant.  Public credit registry dummy is insignificant in all specifications. Model 1   17
presents the baseline specification and in model 2 we add legal origin dummies. We find 
that firms in the French legal origin countries and transition countries
8 have higher 
constraints relative to firms in countries with English legal origin even after controlling 
for the rule of law. The results on private and public registry are unchanged with the 
addition of the legal origin dummies.  
In models 3, 4 and 5 we control for other aspects of the banking sector 
environment.  We expect that in a country with many government owned banks financing 
constraints are likely to be higher. In addition, such countries are more likely to have a 
public registry.  However, we find this variable to be insignificant (model 3).
9 We also 
suspect that in a country with a highly concentrated banking system access to finance 
would be more restricted, but we do not find a significant relation (model 4).  In model 5 
we inspect whether use of international accounting standards or audited financial 
statements has an effect on self-reported financing constraints.  Coefficients of both 
accounting information variables are insignificant.  Although we are sill unable to 
completely eliminate the concern that private registry is a proxy for some unobservable 
element of the institutional environment in a country, it is robust to inclusion of all the 
available institutional indicators as reported in the table and in additional regressions that 
are not reported.   
In the remaining columns in table 4 we focus on interaction effects of registries 
and firm and environment characteristics.  In model 6 we investigate the relationship 
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking “transition” is not a legal origin.  There is a debate among international comparative law 
experts as to the classification of legal traditions in these countries, for example Czech Republic and 
Hungary  are often identified as German legal origin.  In our opinion, however, separating this subset set of 
countries and referring to them as “transition” or “socialist legal origin” is a useful proxy for the institutions 
and some elements of legal and regulatory structure that these countries inherited. 
9 One should be careful interpreting this specification as this variable is not available for many countries 
and we loose about 1000 observations comparing to the baseline model.     18
between rule of law and effectiveness of credit registry.  We hypothesize that in countries 
with better rule of law, credit registry should be more effective.  For example, 
enforcement of consumer rights that would allow individuals and firms to question and 
correct data in the registry is likely to result in better quality of data, and subsequently 
better predictive power of future borrower behavior.  Also better rule of law is likely to 
be associated with integrity of credit reporting system.  As expected, we obtain a strong 
negative coefficient on the interaction dummy for rule of law and private credit registry. 
In other words, we find that private credit registries are more effective in reducing   
perceived financing constraints in countries with stronger rule of law.  
In model 7 we examine whether existence of a credit bureau makes it easier for an 
older firm to obtain credit with an interaction of registry dummy and the new firm 
dummy. Several effects could be at play in determining the relationship between the 
effectiveness of the registry for older and newer firms.  On the one hand, we would 
expect that as old firms have accumulated a credit history with a registry they should be 
able to benefit more from the presence of the registry than young firms which have no 
credit history.  This would produce a positive coefficient indicating higher constraints for 
new firms in countries with a registry.  Alternatively, when evaluating creditworthiness 
of a business, and especially small and medium businesses, bankers take into account 
personal credit history of the owner.
10   This would mean, that in the countries with credit 
registry obtaining a loan for a new business should not be significantly more difficult 
than for an old one, if owner credit history is available.  Results of regression in model 6 
seem to support the latter hypothesis.  We do not find significant difference for old and 
                                                 
10 Miller (2003)    19
new firms in the presence of credit registry regarding their perceived financing 
constraints. 
Lastly, we study the effect of  credit registries for financing constraints faced by 
small and medium firms.  One hypothesis related to firm’s size is that existence of a 
credit registry could help small and medium firms more than large firms.  While lending 
to large companies requires detailed analysis of financial standing of the potential 
borrower and significant loan size justifies high costs of such analysis, payment history 
information alone is viewed to be a sufficiently good predictor of the probability of 
default for smaller loans.  Use of such information in automated decision making 
systems, such as credit scoring, allows to cut processing costs and to increase lending 
volume significantly
11.  In model 8 , however, we get insignificant coefficients for small 
or medium enterprises, indicating that there is no difference in the effect that credit 
registry has on small or medium firms relative to large enterprises in terms of their 
perception of financing constraints.  
 Table 5 provides a similar set of regressions using  reliance on bank financing as 
a dependent variable.  We find that the coefficient for private credit registry is positive 
and significant in almost al specifications, while coefficients for public credit registry 
variable is of varying sign and never significantly different from zero.   Results in model 
2 suggest that transition economies have on average significantly lower percentage of 
bank financing.  We do not find significant effects of government ownership of banks or 
banking industry concentration.  But  in model 5 we get significant positive coefficients 
for international accounting standards and audited financial statements variables.  It is 
interesting, that while we did not detect any significant link between accounting   20
standards and self-reported financing constraints, we do find strong positive effects for 
the reliance of bank finance. 
Old firms do not seem to be benefiting more than young ones from private credit 
registry (model 6).   At the same time coefficient for public registry and firm age dummy 
interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that in countries with public credit 
registries there is a higher share of bank financing in new firms.  We have tested 
alternative specifications, including using age of firm instead of a dummy variable for 
new firms and controlling for transition economies which have larger number of new 
firms than other countries, but obtained similar results.  One potential explanation could 
be in the fact that most public registries only distribute information on the current status 
of the borrower, rather than borrower’s history over a period of time.  Moreover public 
registries mandate participation in the credit registry by all supervised institutions and 
collect both positive (information on borrowers who pay on time) and negative 
information (data on defaults and delinquencies), while information in private registries is 
fragmented and mostly negative
12.  This may result in improved availability of financing 
for new firms since bank is mandated to report a borrower the moment loan is granted, 
while most private registry would report a borrower only if she was delinquent or 
defaulted on a payment.  It is possible that new borrowers have lower delinquency and 
default incidence and thus more likely to appear in a public registry, than in a private one.  
Further research is needed to investigate the effect of public registries on bank financing 
reliance and in particular on the effect it has on new firms.         
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Frame (2001) 
12 Miller(2003), World Bank (2003)   21
In the last column of Table 5 we investigate effect of the registry for small and 
medium firms.  Existence of public registry does not seem to be affecting reliance on 
bank credit for small and medium firms differently than for large firms.  But, existence of 
a private registry is associated with higher average percent of bank financing in small and 
medium enterprises.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis presented above.   
In sum,  our empirical tests find that private credit registries are strongly 
correlated with lower perceived financing constraints and higher reliance on bank 
financing.  These results support the view for the role such institutions may play in 
improving access to credit.  At the same time, we fail to find  systematic relation between 
existence of a public registry and firm-reported financing constraints  or reliance on bank 
financing.   
This finding is consistent with our proposition that the major goal for most public 
credit registries is banking supervision.  In this case credit registry would mostly focus on 
monitoring performance of large loans that could potentially have systemic effects in the 
economy and provide only a small amount of information to a limited number of banking 
institutions, while major sources for firm financing could be among non-bank creditors.  
Several other factors may contribute to the low effectiveness of public registries in 
improving access to finance.  Miller (2003) and “Doing Business in 2004”  report, 
recently issued by the World Bank, compare the data available in public and private 
registries and find that credit information in public registries is more limited in scope and 
most public registries only provide information on the status of the borrower in the latest 
reporting period, rather than reporting the history of borrower’s payment behavior over 
several years.  Both authors suggest that private registries are better suited to serve the   22
needs of lenders than the public ones.  It is also likely that the data found in public 
registries is of poor quality and does not allow banks to use it effectively for assessment 
of creditworthiness of borrowers.
13 
More research is needed to clarify the role of public registries in the credit market.  
For example, the positive (though insignificant) coefficients we get indicate that public 
registries are associated with higher financing constraints.  One potential explanation for 
such counter-intuitive result could be the fact that often public registries appear in the 
markets with very low credit penetration as an attempt by the government to stimulate 
and promote lending.  To test this hypothesis some dynamic studies are required. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Using unique cross-country firm level data we study the effect of credit reporting 
institutions on financing constraints as they are perceived by a firm’s managers and on 
firm’s reliance on bank financing.  We find that the existence of private credit registries is 
associated with lower financing constraints and higher share of bank borrowing in firm’s 
financing structure, while public credit registries do not seem to have significant effect on 
availability of financing.  We find that in countries that have a public registry in addition 
to a private registry the perceived constraints are higher than in countries with only 
private registries. Although this suggests that public registries are associated with higher 
financing constraints (even though we did not find similar effect regarding firms’ reliance 
on bank financing), they might play an overall positive role in financial markets by 
performing other functions (for example aiding in regulation and supervision or 
                                                 
13 Miller(2003),  World Bank(2003)   23
prevention of systemic crises). This suggests more research on the role of public credit 
registries.  
An important finding is that private credit registries are positively related to availability 
of bank financing for small and medium firms.   We also find that stronger rule of law is 
associated with more effective private credit registries. This finding has obvious policy 
implications and highlights the necessity of strong legal system for the operation of credit 
markets as a whole and credit registries in particular.  
Although we believe that our study adds to the recent literature, it has some 
obvious limitations. The major limitation is a lack of evidence for causality between 
creation of the private registries and their consequent effect on financing constraints. It is 
plausible that in a country with greater use of bank finance, the establishment of credit 
registries is more likely. The reverse causality is less likely for the measures of firm’s 
self-reported financing constraints. Nevertheless, the results in this paper should be taken 
with caution and interpreted only as correlations and not as casual effects. In addition, it 
is possible that other unobservable elements of financial markets are responsible for the 
relationship we attribute to private credit registries. Although we were not able to shake 
the significant of the private registry coefficients with any of the available proxies for 
other elements of financial development, this concern remains as in any cross-country 
study.   
Finally, an additional hypothesis that we do not address here is whether public 
registries are responses of government to underdeveloped shallow financial markets and 
hence are associated with higher constrains, while private registries develop 
endogenously when markets are “ready” and access to finance is not as constrained. To   24
overcome these limitations further research would be needed to study dynamic 
relationships between events leading to the establishments of credit registries, their 
creation, and subsequent improvement in financial development and reduction in a firm’s 
financing constraints.    25
Table 1.  List of countries with public and private credit registries and their dates of 
establishment. 
 
Public Registry exists  Private registry exists 
Africa 
NIGERIA (1998)   
SENEGAL (1979)   
EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC (1957)  
TUNISIA (1958)   
   
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
LITHUANIA (1995)   
 ESTONIA  (1993) 
 HUNGARY  (1997) 
 POLAND  (1997) 
 TURKEY  (1995) 
Asia 
INDONESIA (1988)   
MALAYSIA   MALAYSIA (1985) 
Latin America and Caribbean 
ARGENTINA (1991)  ARGENTINA (1957) 
BOLIVIA (1988)  BOLIVIA (1994) 
BRAZIL (1997)  BRAZIL (1968) 
CHILE (1977)  CHILE (1979) 
COLOMBIA (1994)  COLOMBIA (1982) 
DOMINICAN REPUBL (1994)  DOMINICAN REPUBL (1994) 
ECUADOR (1997)  ECUADOR (1966) 
EL SALVADOR (1994)  EL SALVADOR (1996) 
GUATEMALA (1996)  GUATEMALA (1976) 
MEXICO (1964)  MÉXICO (1995) 
PERU (1968)  PERU (1997) 
URUGUAY (1982)  URUGUAY (1954) 
COSTA RICA (1996)   
NICARAGUA (1994)   
VENEZUELA (1975)   
 PANAMA  (1956) 
Developed countries 
GERMANY (1934)  GERMANY (1927) 
ITALY (1962)  ITALY (1989) 
PORTUGAL (1978)  PORTUGAL (1947) 
SPAIN (1962)  SPAIN (1992) 
FRANCE (1946)   
  CANADA (1919) 
 SWEDEN  (1977) 
  UNITED KINGDOM (1980) 
 UNITED  STATES  (1930)   26
Table 2. Cross tabulations for general financing constraints, private credit to GDP 
ratio, and bank finance. 
 
Panel A. Cross tabulation of General Financing Constraint 
Means ( Frequencies)  
 
 
No Yes Total 
No   3.13 2.42 2.91
  (2407) (1127) (3534)
Yes   2.75 2.67 2.69
  (805) (1808) (2613)
Total  3.04 2.57 2.82
 (3212) (2935) (6147)
 










No   19.97 57.78 32.37
 (2338) (1141) (3479)
Yes   33.58 48.69 43.42
 (983) (1835) (2818)
Total 24.00 52.17 37.32
 (3321) (2976) (6297)
 





No   0.29 0.50 0.35
  (2262) (1036) (3298)
Yes   0.39 0.57 0.53
  (545) (1655) (2200)
Total  0.31 0.54 0.42
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Table 3.  Effect of credit registries on financing constraints and bank financing. 
Models A1-A4 are estimated using probit and models B1-B4 are estimated using ordered probit techniques.  
See Table A1 for variable definitions and sources. Standard errors are clustered by country. P-values are in 
parenthesis, ** indicates significance at 1% level and * at 5% level. 
 
  Dependent variable: perceived financing 
constraints dummy 
Dependent variable: reliance on bank 
financing 
  A1 A2 A3 A4 B1 B2 B3 B4 
Government  Ownership  0.376 0.343 0.25  0.232 -0.244  -0.14 -0.143  -0.093 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.002)** (0.005)**  (0.000)**  (0.056) (0.061) (0.184) 
Foreign  Ownership   -0.327 -0.328 -0.355 -0.343 0.029  0.017  0.02  0.002 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.617)  (0.757)  (0.72  (0.969) 
New firm   -0.014  -0.029  -0.042  -0.035 -0.246 -0.194 -0.184 -0.144 
  (0.809) (0.628) (0.421) (0.493) (0.000)**  (0.001)**  (0.002)**  (0.012)* 
Manufacturing  -0.086 -0.071 -0.01  -0.003 0.22  0.186  0.187  0.165 
  (0.269) (0.361) (0.909) (0.975) (0.000)**  (0.005)**  (0.004)**  (0.008)** 
Services  -0.294 -0.286 -0.227 -0.228 0.041  0.002  -0.005 -0.01 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.010)** (0.010)**  (0.562) (0.972) (0.937) (0.883) 
Small  firm  0.289 0.238 0.237 0.202 -0.629  -0.561  -0.566  -0.533 
  (0.002)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.010)*  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Medium  firm  0.208 0.183 0.163 0.17  -0.21 -0.172  -0.174  -0.173 
 (0.002)**  (0.006)**  (0.015)*  (0.007)**  (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.004)** 
Public  registry    0.091 -0.189  0.238   0.112 0.18  0.249 
    (0.361) (0.134) (0.18)    (0.185) (0.131) (0.141) 
Private  registry    -0.293 -0.469 -0.133   0.378  0.415  0.099 
    (0.014)*  (0.007)** (0.45)    (0.000)** (0.004)** (0.328) 
GNI  per  capita  -0.097  -0.048    0.089  -0.031    
  (0.178)  (0.54)    (0.204)  (0.651)    
Private  Credit/GDP  0.002  0.002    0.001  0.001    
  (0.413)  (0.428)    (0.428)  (0.587)    
Real interest rate  0.001  0.002      0  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003 
  (0.602) (0.315)     (0.873) (0.368) (0.291) (0.239) 
GDP  growth -0.039  -0.028    0.05  0.023  0.028  0.025 
  (0.068) (0.262)     (0.000)**  (0.084) (0.133) (0.115) 
Rule  of  Law  -0.336 -0.288 -0.285 -0.276 -0.058 0.018     
  (0.003)** (0.024)*  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.62)  (0.867)     
“Pessimism”    0.624 0.64  0.614 0.61  0.011 0.02     
 (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.903)  (0.836)     
Public  *Private    0.447     -0.117   
    (0.026)*     (0.493)   
Log (age of public 
registry) 
   - 0 . 0 7      - 0 . 0 5 3  
     (0.225)     (0.365) 
Log (age of private 
registry) 
   -0.076     0.119 
     (0.167)     (0.000)** 
Constant  0.447  0.127  -0.167 -0.188        
  (0.43)  (0.845) (0.224) (0.141)        
Observations  4907 4830 5340 5340 4543 4468 4484 4484 
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Table 4.  Effect of credit registries on perceived financing constraints 
Dependent variable is general financing constraint (dummy), estimated by probit. See Table A1 for variable 
definitions and sources. Standard errors are clustered by country. P-values are in parenthesis, ** indicates 
significance at 1% level and * at 5% level. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Government Ownership   0.255  0.231 0.326 0.295 0.27  0.256 0.254 0.255 
 (0.002)**  (0.004)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.003)** 
Foreign Ownership   -0.35  -0.348  -0.298 -0.326 -0.319 -0.358 -0.35  -0.346 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
New firm   -0.029  -0.034  -0.033  -0.068 -0.05  -0.016 -0.038 -0.032 
 (0.581)  (0.503)  (0.577)  (0.214)  (0.381) (0.775) (0.546) (0.519) 
Manufacturing -0.007  -0.005  -0.032  -0.055 0.017  -0.042 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.939)  (0.953)  (0.751)  (0.525)  (0.839) (0.609) (0.938) (0.921) 
Services -0.23  -0.24  -0.237  -0.244 -0.244 -0.252 -0.23  -0.236 
 (0.009)**  (0.006)**  (0.016)*  (0.005)**  (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.009)** (0.006)** 
Small firm  0.234  0.219  0.325 0.257 0.231 0.248 0.234 0.229 
 (0.005)**  (0.005)**  (0.000)**  (0.004)**  (0.013)* (0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.213) 
Medium firm  0.177  0.171  0.218 0.197 0.173 0.193 0.176 0.157 
 (0.008)**  (0.006)**  (0.001)**  (0.005)**  (0.009)** (0.004)** (0.008)** (0.295) 
Public registry  0.052  -0.032  0.041 0.033 0.082 -0.032  0.052 -0.041 
 (0.606)  (0.822)  (0.72)  (0.756)  (0.427) (0.767) (0.621) (0.791) 
Private registry  -0.272  -0.298  -0.264 -0.246 -0.288 -0.251 -0.277 -0.213 
 (0.020)*  (0.017)*  (0.049)*  (0.031)*  (0.021)* (0.037)* (0.022)* (0.212) 
Rule of Law  -0.326  -0.239  -0.364  -0.388 -0.314 -0.066 -0.326 -0.323 
 (0.000)**  (0.002)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** -0.619  (0.000)** (0.000)** 
“Pessimism” index  0.607  0.609  0.576 0.537 0.578 0.612 0.607 0.605 
 (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)**  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Transition  country   0.31        
   (0.035)*        
Legal origin - French    0.39             
   (0.028)*        
Government ownership of banks      -0.048           
    (0.842)       
Banking  concentration     0.154      
     (0.503)      
International  Accounting  Standards      -0.095     
      (0.115)     
Audited  financial  statements      -0.017     
      (0.796)     
(Public registry)* (rule of law)            0.049     
       (0.654)    
(Private registry)* (Rule of law)            -0.451     
       (0.001)**    
(Public registry)* (new firm)              -0.002   
        (0.993)   
(Private registry)* (New  firm)        0.037   
        (0.772)   
(Public  registry)*  (Small)        0.083 
         (0.604) 
(Public  registry)*  (Medium)         0.142 
         (0.238) 
(Private  registry)*  (Small)         -0.077 
         (0.664) 
(Private  registry)*  (Medium)         -0.085 
         (0.526) 
Constant -0.23  -0.476  -0.241  -0.299 -0.191 -0.129 -0.227 -0.21 
 (0.085)  (0.004)**  (0.062)  (0.089)  (-0.166) (-0.382) (-0.094) (0.287) 
Observations  5340 5340 4274 4728 4723 5340 5340 5340 
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Table 5.  Effect of credit registries on availability of bank financing. 
Dependent variable is reliance on bank financing, estimated by ordered probit. See Table A1 for variable 
definitions and sources. Standard errors are clustered by country. P-values are in parenthesis, ** indicates 
significance at 1% level and * at 5% level. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Government Ownership   -0.144  -0.074 -0.147 -0.119 -0.144 -0.148 -0.169 
  (0.054) (0.275) (0.106) (0.123) (0.057) (0.047)*  (0.044)* 
Foreign Ownership   0.019  0.008  -0.032 -0.01  -0.047 0.014  0.016 
  (0.74) (0.891)  (0.569)  (0.85) (0.425)  (0.797)  (0.775) 
New firm   -0.188  -0.145  -0.14  -0.155 -0.182 -0.264 -0.157 
 (0.001)**  (0.011)*  (0.044)*  (0.005)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.005)** 
Manufacturing 0.186  0.161  0.148 0.166 0.162 0.187 0.181 
 (0.004)**  (0.012)*  (0.036)*  (0.009)** (0.017)*  (0.004)** (0.005)** 
Services -0.002  -0.01  -0.03  -0.003 -0.037 -0.005 0.025 
  (0.975) (0.884) (0.656) (0.964) (0.615) (0.945) (0.717) 
Small firm  -0.564  -0.491  -0.519 -0.522 -0.489 -0.567 -0.848 
  (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** 
Medium firm  -0.176  -0.138  -0.187 -0.174 -0.145 -0.178 -0.353 
  (0.002)** (0.020)*  (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.029)*  (0.002)** (0.001)** 
Public registry  0.109  -0.201  0.119 0.094 0.089 0.062 0.157 
  (0.167) (0.174) (0.222) (0.308) (0.281) (0.47)  (0.327) 
Private registry  0.366  0.277 0.309 0.33  0.335 0.382 0.112 
  (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.009)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.483) 
Real interest rate  -0.002  -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.191) (0.323) (0.462) (0.554) (0.363) (0.253) (0.327) 
GDP growth  0.029  0.027  0.045 0.044 0.025 0.028 0.02 
  (0.114) (0.059) (0.073) (0.021)*  (0.146) (0.114) (0.162) 
Transition  country   -0.314       
   (0.015)*       
Legal  origin  -  French   0.181       
   ( 0 . 2 2 )        
Government ownership of banks      0.071         
    (0.72)      
Banking  concentration    0.105     
     (0.674)     
International Accounting 
Standards 
    0.154    
      (0.002)**    
Audited  financial  statements      0.159    
      (0.003)**    
(Public registry)* (new firm)            0.418   
       (0.003)**   
(Private registry)* (New  firm)       -0.121   
       (0.346)   
(Public  registry)*  (Small)        0.111 
        (0.575) 
(Public  registry)*  (Medium)        -0.197 
        (0.171) 
(Private  registry)*  (Small)        0.387 
        ( 0 . 0 6 )  
(Private  registry)*  (Medium)        0.389 
        (0.030)* 
Observations  4484 4484 3589 4036 3975 4484 4484 
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Table A1. Variable Names and Sources 
Variable Names  Description  Source 
General Financing 
Constraint 
A ranking of the severity of the financing 
constraints to the growth and operation of the 
business (this question was asked along with 
11 other constraining factors). The respondents 
were asked to select only 3 factors as “major 
obstacles”. The ranking has  a scale of 1 
through 4: 1 is “no obstacle”, 2 is “minor 
obstacle”, 3 is “moderate obstacle” and 4 is 






Equals one if general financing constraint is 
cited as a “major obstacle”.  
WBES 
Reliance on Bank 
Financing 
Variable takes values from 0 to 10 based on 
survey responses regarding the structure of 
firm financing.  It is equal zero if cumulative 
share of commercial, development and foreign 
bank financing is 0, value of one if share of 
bank financing is less or equal to 10%, value of 
2 if it is more than 10% but less or equal to 
20%, and so on. 
WBES 
Reliance on Bank 
Financing 
Dummy is equal zero if Reliance on Bank 
Finance is zero, one otherwise. 
WBES 
Government Ownership    Dummy is equal one if any government 
agency or state body has a financial stake in the 
ownership of the firm, zero otherwise. 
 WBES 
Foreign Ownership   Dummy variable is equal one if any foreign 
company or individual has a financial stake in 
the ownership of the firm, zero otherwise. 
WBES 
New firm   Dummy variable is equal one if the age of firm 
is less than 5 years.  The age of firms is 
calculated as a difference between 2000 and 
the year of the establishment of the firm 
WBES 
Manufacturing   Dummy variable that is equal one if firm is in 
the manufacturing industry, zero otherwise. 
WBES 
Services   Dummy variable is equal one if firm is in the 
service industry, zero otherwise. 
WBES 
Small   Dummy variable is equal one if the business 
employs less than 50 people, zero otherwise  
WBES 
Medium   Dummy variable is equal one if the business 
employs more than 50 and less than 200 
people, zero otherwise 
WBES 








Real Interest rate  Average lending rate minus average inflation 
rate in 1999. 
International 
Financial Statistics   33
 
Rule of law  Composite Rule of Law Indicator  Aggregate 
Governance 
Indicators, Kaufmann 
et al (1999) 
Private Credit/GDP  Measure of private credit to GDP.  Beck et al. (2002) 
Public registry (dummy)  Dummy variable is equal one if there is a 
public registry operating in a country prior to 
1998, zero otherwise 
Global Survey of 
Public Credit 
Registries 
Private registry (dummy)  Dummy variable is equal one if there is a 
private registry operating in a country prior to 
1998, zero otherwise. 
Global Survey of 
Private Credit 
Registries 
Log (age of public)  Logarithm of the age of public credit registry.  
The age of the public registry is calculated as a 
difference between 2000 and the year of 
establishment of the public registry. It equals to 
zero for countries without registries. 
Global Survey of 
Public Credit 
Registries 
Log (age of private)  Logarithm of the age of public credit registry.  
The age of the public registry is calculated as a 
difference between 2000 and the year of 
establishment of the earliest private registry. It 
equals to zero for countries without registries.  
Global Survey of 
Private Credit 
Registries 
Legal Origin – French   Dummy variable is equal one if legal origin is 
French, zero otherwise 
La Porta et al (1998) 
Transition country   Dummy variable is equal one if legal origin is 
Socialist, zero otherwise 
La Porta et al (1998) 
Pessimism  Index of a manager’s “pessimism” equal to (Q 
- Q )/Q, where Q – the average of answers 
referring to the quality of public services 
(customs, courts, post office, etc.) given by 
each firm, higher values indicate lower 
quality. Q - average of Q in a given country 
WBES 
Government ownership of 
banks  
Proportion of assets of a country’s top ten 
banking institutions that were held by the 
public banks 
La Porta et al. (2002) 
Banking concentration  Three largest banks assets  Database on Financial 
Development and 




Dummy variable is equal one if the firm uses 




Dummy variable is equal one if the firm uses 
audited financial statements 
WBES 
 